Scott Minnich Testimony

The Washington Post has this report on the testimony of Scott Minnich at the Kitzmiller trial:

A biology professor who supports classroom discussion of "intelligent design" testified Friday that major peer-reviewed scientific journals shun articles on the concept because it is a minority view.

"To endorse intelligent design comes with risk because it's a position against the consensus. Science is not a democratic process," University of Idaho microbiology professor Scott Minnich said under cross-examination.

. . .

Minnich testified that intelligent design is based on science and doesn't require adherence to any religious belief. He also praised the prescribed statement to students.

More detail on his testimony can be found here.

Minnich's witness report can be found here.

Justice Scalia and Drunken Legislators

As we near the end of the Kitzmiller v. Dover case, I thought it appropriate to quote Justice Scalia's dissent in the Edwards v. Aguillard case regarding the purpose prong of the Lemon test. The Lemon test is the standard the US Supreme Court uses to interpret the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the US Constitution. The Court in Lemon stated this:

Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion." (citations removed; bold added)

The following is what Justice Scalia said in Edwards. His words are especially insightful given the reports on the testimony and actions of some of the Dover school board members. If you want a laugh, make sure you read the second paragraph:

Our cases interpreting and applying the purpose test have made such a maze of the Establishment Clause that even the most conscientious governmental officials can only guess what motives will be held unconstitutional. We have said essentially the following: Government may not act with the purpose of advancing religion, except when forced to do so by the Free Exercise Clause (which is now and then); or when eliminating existing governmental hostility to religion (which exists sometimes); or even when merely accommodating governmentally uninhibited religious practices, except that at some point (it is unclear where) intentional accommodation results in the fostering of religion, which is of course unconstitutional. See supra, at 614-618.

But the difficulty of knowing what vitiating purpose one is looking for is as nothing compared with the difficulty of knowing how or where to find it. For while it is possible to discern the objective "purpose" of a statute (i. e., the public good at which its provisions appear to be directed), or even the formal motivation for a statute where that is explicitly set forth (as it was, to no avail, here), discerning the subjective motivation of those enacting the statute is, to be honest, almost always an impossible task. The number of possible [p. 637] motivations, to begin with, is not binary, or indeed even finite. In the present case, for example, a particular legislator need not have voted for the Act either because he wanted to foster religion or because he wanted to improve education. He may have thought the bill would provide jobs for his district, or may have wanted to make amends with a faction of his party he had alienated on another vote, or he may have been a close friend of the bill's sponsor, or he may have been repaying a favor he owed the majority leader, or he may have hoped the Governor would appreciate his vote and make a fundraising appearance for him, or he may have been pressured to vote for a bill he disliked by a wealthy contributor or by a flood of constituent mail, or he may have been seeking favorable publicity, or he may have been reluctant to hurt the feelings of a loyal staff member who worked on the bill, or he may have been settling an old score with a legislator who opposed the bill, or he may have been mad at his wife who opposed the bill, or he may have been intoxicated and utterly unmotivated when the vote was called, or he may have accidentally voted "yes" instead of "no," or, of course, he may have had (and very likely did have) a combination of some of the above and many other motivations. To look for the sole purpose of even a single legislator is probably to look for something that does not exist.

Putting that problem aside, however, where ought we to look for the individual legislator's purpose? We cannot of course assume that every member present (if, as is unlikely, we know who or even how many they were) agreed with the motivation expressed in a particular legislator's preenactment floor or committee statement. Quite obviously, "[w]hat motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968). Can we assume, then, that they all agree with the motivation expressed in the staff-prepared committee reports they might have read - even though we are unwilling to [p. 638] assume that they agreed with the motivation expressed in the very statute that they voted for? Should we consider postenactment floor statements? Or postenactment testimony from legislators, obtained expressly for the lawsuit? Should we consider media reports on the realities of the legislative bargaining? All of these sources, of course, are eminently manipulable. Legislative histories can be contrived and sanitized, favorable media coverage orchestrated, and postenactment recollections conveniently distorted. Perhaps most valuable of all would be more objective indications - for example, evidence regarding the individual legislators' religious affiliations. And if that, why not evidence regarding the fervor or tepidity of their beliefs?

Having achieved, through these simple means, an assessment of what individual legislators intended, we must still confront the question (yet to be addressed in any of our cases) how many of them must have the invalidating intent. If a state senate approves a bill by vote of 26 to 25, and only one of the 26 intended solely to advance religion, is the law unconstitutional? What if 13 of the 26 had that intent? What if 3 of the 26 had the impermissible intent, but 3 of the 25 voting against the bill were motivated by religious hostility or were simply attempting to "balance" the votes of their impermissibly motivated colleagues? Or is it possible that the intent of the bill's sponsor is alone enough to invalidate it - on a theory, perhaps, that even though everyone else's intent was pure, what they produced was the fruit of a forbidden tree?

I raise this question: do we really want case law binding on the entire United States based on what a handful of local school board members allegedly said or did, or what their personal religious beliefs are?

Breaking News: Cardinal says Science Is Good

The Washington Post has an article today on comments by another Catholic cardinal on ID. He doesn't say much and pretty much states the obvious:

A Vatican cardinal said Thursday the faithful should listen to what secular modern science has to offer, warning that religion risks turning into "fundamentalism" if it ignores scientific reason.

The article also has this on evolution/ID:

Poupard, for his part, stressed that what was important was that "the universe wasn't made by itself, but has a creator." But he added, "It's important for the faithful to know how science views things to understand better."

I am not sure what is newsworthy in this. Religion is good. Science is good. I agree.

Samuel A. Alito Jr. and Evidence Against Macroevolutionary Theory

As with Harriet Miers, whether Samuel Alito is confirmed may have more impact on the ultimate result in Kitzmiller v. Dover (and whether scientific evidence against macroevolutionary theory may be presented to students) than what goes on the courtroom this week. If preliminary indications on his views on church-state issues prove accurate, Anthony Kennedy may be the next swing vote on such issues. My previous post on this is here.

The Washington Post article on his nomination is here, his profile is here, and the transcript of the announcement is here.

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The Post has more today on Alito, here and here.

The Lighter Side of Blackmail

Krauze is the smartest guy in the whole wide world, and I bow to his superior intelligence. Also, he’s quite the hunk.

For an explanation of how this relates to the heavy handed tactics of the National Academy of Sciences and the National Science Teachers Association, go here.

So Krauze, would you really apply this requirement to male and female critics equally? Not that there would be anything wrong with that.

One of the complaints by the science groups is that the definition of science in the revised standards "could lead students to believe that supernatural explanations also may fall within the purview of science." Really? Here is the definition of science to which they object:

Science is a systematic method of continuing investigation that uses observations, hypothesis testing, measurement, experimentation, logical argument and theory building, to lead to more adequate explanations of natural phenomena.

Anybody see any supernaturalism in there?

One blogger called it "scientific blackmail." I am not sure that it rises to that level, since it really functions as just an annoyance. The copyrights protect the specific expression of ideas, but not the underlying facts, ideas or concepts. In addition, the fair use provision would allow for some quotation, even without permission from these groups. Kansas just has to rewrite the standards in their own words. Perhaps the new standards that Kansas develops will set the new "standard" for other open-minded states. I expect that Kansas will not be as petty as the science groups and will share the new standards freely with other open-minded states.

Phillip Johnson calls the action by the science groups "panicky and hysterical."