"The idea that science can, and should, be run according to fixed and universal rules is both unrealistic and pernicious."

I have not had much time to post recently, but I thought I would put up one quote from Alan Chalmers, which I discovered in a debate in the comments to the post "One More Reason Why ID Is Not Religion":

I am happy to join Feyerabend in regarding the idea of a universal and ahistoric method as highly implausible and even absurd. As Feyerabend (1975, p. 295) says, "The idea that science can, and should, be run according to fixed and universal rules is both unrealistic and pernicious," is "detrimental to science, for it neglects the complex physical and historical conditions which influence scientific change: and "makes science less adaptable and more dogmatic." If there is to be a scientific method capable of judging sciences of all kinds, past, present and future, one might well ask what resources philosophers have for arriving at such a potent tool, so potent that it can tell us in advance what are the appropriate standards for judging future science. If we have a conception of science as an open-ended quest to improve our knowledge, then why cannot there be room for us to improve our methods and adapt and refine our standards in the light of what we learn.